A key marker of early Western modernity is the rise of the secular state. In our present modernity, the state has withdrawn from many domains and other forces are ascendant, among them transnationalized organized religions. The current period makes legible the variability of the spaces (institutional, ideational, tactical) of organized religions over time, and critically, shows how the progressive secularism assumed in social science may have gotten it wrong. On the one hand, the secularization of states is not an inevitable outcome of modernity. On the other, the role of organized religions is not inevitably confined to narrower and narrower domains as modernity proceeds, and, in fact, new types of globalities and cosmopolitanisms in several religions are becoming visible in our current modernity. These diverse trends unsettle the meaning of modernity. Several major and growing organized religions now occupy a place/role/potential in liberal democracies that was not foreseen in the major theories and models. This rise of religion is often seen as anomalous from the perspective of modernization theory, akin to a state of exception that cannot last. In my analysis, it is part of this particular phase of modernity that I see, structurally speaking, as a function of centrifugal tendencies in contrast to the centripetal tendencies that dominated the epoch of the formation of the secular modern state. In order to capture the modernity of what might be seen as anomalous from an enlightenment perspective, and, at worst, regressive or anachronistic, we need to recover the historicity of the particular assemblage of territory, authority and rights represented by the nation-state, and its specific type of modernism. The modernity of the state was centered in an overarching tendency towards concentration of the power to legitimate in the sovereign, the state. Today we see multiple minor centrifugal processes that dislodge bits of territory, authority and rights from their nation-state encasements. Though never absolutely, each of the three components – territory, authority, rights (TAR) - is constituted as an exclusively national domain in the Western modern state. Today, particular elements of TAR are becoming reassembled into novel global configurations. Therewith, their mutual interactions and interdependencies are altered, as are their institutional encasements. These alterations take place both within the nation-state, for example, from public to private, and through shifts to the supranational and global level. This sharpening differentiation among domains once suffused within the national, or the supranational, promotes a multiplication of diverse spatio-temporal framings and diverse normative orders where once the dominant logic was toward producing unitary national spatial, temporal, and normative framings. What was bundled up and experienced as
a unitary condition - the national assemblage of TAR - now increasingly reveals itself to be far less unitary and exclusive than is suggested in common representations of the modern state. This leads to an ideological re-nationalizing of states that compensates for the thinning structural grounding. In contrast, organized religions are increasingly recognized as far more global and cosmopolitan, than what the old enlightenment view allowed.